An online survey system provides a convenient way for people to conduct surveys. It removes the necessity of human resources to hold paper surveys or telephone interviews and hence reduces the cost significantly. Nevertheless, accuracy and privacy remain as the major obstacles that need additional attention. To conduct an accurate survey, privacy maybe lost, and vice versa. In this paper, we provide new insight to preserve these two seeming contradictory issues in online survey systems especially suitable in big data era. We propose a secure system, which is shown to be efficient and practical by simulation data. Our analysis further shows that the proposed solution is desirable not only in online survey systems but also in several potential applications, including E-Voting, Smart-Grid and Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks. 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland.
Introduction
Privacy has always been considered as a significant issue in our daily life. As an age-old concern, it is not unique in the digital world but the advances in digital technologies have brought an array of new privacy challenges. The granularity (or depth) of information captured in the digital world and the rapid information dissemination facilitated by the Internet are factors that contribute most to those new privacy concerns.
Online Survey System. One of the situations that privacy plays an important factor is an online survey system. An online survey system (e.g., Kwik Survey [15] , My3q [23] or Survey Monkey [30] ) is an Internet surveying technique in which the interviewee follows a script provided in a website. The questionnaires are created in a program for creating web interviews. The program allows for the questionnaire to contain pictures, audio and video clips, or links to different web pages. The website is able to customize the flow of the questionnaire based on the answers provided, as well as information already known about the participant. It is considered to be a cheaper way of conducting surveys since it does not require any human resources to conduct surveys or telephone interview. With the increasing use of the Internet, online questionnaires have become a popular way of collecting information. The design of an online questionnaire often has an effect on the quality of data gathered. There are many factors in designing an online questionnaire, and issues including guidelines, available question formats, administration, accuracy and privacy should be carefully addressed. Here we focus on the last two factors.
A survey form may collect the interviewee's personal particulars, such as sex, age, salary range and interest. Such information may be very useful for the interviewer to conduct a survey with accurate information. However, the interviewer has no way to verify the authenticity of this information. For example, a 15 years old boy may say that "she" is a 50 years old woman earning one million US dollars per annual. This may not be possible if a face-to-face survey or telephone interviewing survey is carried out, or at least to some certain extent. Nevertheless, in a virtual world such as Internet, anonymity without authentication means the source is highly questionable. Furthermore, this 15 years old boy may fill in the online survey multiple times. Next time he may pretend he is a retired 80 years old man. There is no way to verify whether these 2 different surveys are from the same source or not.
Digital signature provides an easy and convenient way to authenticate the message sender in the Internet. By digitally signing a message (the survey), the verifier (the interviewer) can be convinced that the sender is a person with true particulars provided. Using the above example, assume Bob is that 15 years old boy. If he signs the survey, the interviewer may check his certificate (or identity if ID-based signature [29] is used) to find out his personal information from the certificate authority (or private key generator for ID-based signature). He cannot pretend to be another person. If he conducts the survey more than once, it will be easily detected since the signature contains the information of the signer.
It seems that digital signature can easily solve the problem of accuracy. However, on the other side, signing the survey means the loss of privacy. In reality, many users are not willing to reveal their real identities to interviewers due to privacy concerns. If it is a compulsory requirement for conducting the survey, they will decline the survey invitation. It maybe the main reason that many existing online survey systems do not compulsorily require interviewees to input their real identifying information (or no need to verify their information, e.g., no email validation is required).
Contributions. In this paper, we provide a new insight to preserve accuracy and privacy in online survey systems. We propose a new system which provides the following desirable features: 1. Authentication: It allows only those authenticated or qualified users to take part into the survey.
Anonymity:
No one knows the identity of the user who has submitted the survey. 3. Detection of double submission: No one can submit more than once in a single survey event without being detected. 4. Unlinkability: Given two surveys from two different events, no one can tell whether they are from the same user. 5. Constant Complexity: The complexity of our system is independent to the total number of users in the system. Thus it is particularly suitable for any system with large user database in the big data analytic era.
We provide a concrete instantiation of our system. Further, we show our system to be efficient and practical by some simulation data analysis. We believe our proposed system can fully resolve the contradiction between accuracy and privacy in online survey system. We also suggest other practical applications that can employ our system with only slightly modification required.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some related works will be given in Section 2. Section 3 reviews the preliminaries required in this paper. In Section 4 we give an overview of our scheme, which is followed by detail description in Section 5. We present other applications that can deploy our primitive in Section 6 and conclude our paper in Section 7.
Related Works
There are many ways to resolve the contradiction between user privacy and data accuracy. Several solutions have been proposed and notable examples include ring signatures [27, 6] and group signatures [8, 2] . In ring signatures, one can spontaneously form a group of possible signers and sign on behalf of the group anonymously. One can also use group signatures to sign on behalf of a group of possible signers, but group signatures require an initial group setup procedure performed by the group manager who can revoke the anonymity of any group signer.
Attribute-Based Signatures [28, 16, 22, 26] (or, ABS for short) is another primitive proposed to provide signer anonymity. As a versatile primitive, ABS allows an entity to sign a message with fine-grained control over identifying information. A valid ABS signature attests to the fact that "A single user, whose attributes satisfy the predicate, has endorsed the message". Ring signatures and group signatures are then comparable to special cases of ABS, in which the only allowed predicates are disjunctions over the universe of attributes (identities). In ABS, each entity possesses a set of attributes and a key-authority generates the associated private keys, with which one can sign a message with a predicate satisfied by his/her attributes. The signature reveals no more than the fact that a single user with some set of attributes satisfying the predicate has attested to the message. In particular, ABS does not provide any information on the particular set of attributes used to satisfy the predicate. For example, an "(Engineer, Department A)" or an "(Engineer, Department B)" can independently generate an ABS to assure the recipient that the signature was produced by an "Engineer" without disclosing the department information. Furthermore, users of ABS cannot collude to pool their attributes together (which separates ABS from mesh signatures): It is never possible for an "(Engineer, Department A)" and an "(Auditor, Department B)" to collude and generate an ABS satisfying the predicate "(Auditor, Department A)".
Yet all these solutions cannot resolve the contradiction. They are not practical enough to be used in an online survey system. For example, in a ring signature, it requires the signer to know all other members within the group. It is obvious impossible for an interviewee to know all other interviewee in a survey. For group signature, the properties of the group have to be fixed at the beginning. That is, assume we need to conduct a survey for female engineers aged between 20-25. Such a group has been formed (thus a group manager needs to distribute user secret keys for every user). Later on, another survey for British engineers ages between 20-25 will be conducted. Although there are some overlaps between these two groups of people, the secret key (obtained from the first group) cannot be reused, even for the same person since the properties of the group are fixed. In other words, for every single survey, it is required for the group manager to generate a new set of secret keys to every user. It is again impractical.
ABS seems to be the nearest solution. It provides user privacy. At the same time, it also authenticates the signers for some attributes at a flexible way. For example, assume Alice is a "female" "engineer" working in "Department A". Now there is a survey for all engineers in Department A. Those eligible interviewee including Alice can use their attribute "(Engineer, Department A)" to sign the survey. Later on, another survey for all female staff in department will be conducted. Alice can reuse her secret key but on a different attribute set "(Female, Department A)" to sign the survey. Different from ring signature, she does not need to know who else users will participate the survey. Also different from group signature, she does not need to obtain a different secret key for a different survey.
There is just one problem that ABS cannot resolve. Since ABS is anonymous, by no mean the verifier knows whether Alice has conducted twice or more in a survey, as depicted in Fig 1. In the Internet world, the situation is even worse. There are many programming scripts that can automatically submit online form. By using these scripts, one can submit a thousand of online forms in a very short period of time. The result will then be heavily biased. No existing designs of ABS can detect this kind of behavior.
It is fair to say no existing solutions can perfectly resolve the contradiction in an online survey system.
Preliminaries

Mathematical Definitions
Bilinear Maps. Let G 1 , G 2 , G T be cyclic (multiplicative) groups of order p, where p is a prime. Let g be a generator of G 1 , and h be a generator of G 2 . 
Mathematical Hard Problem. The security of our construction depends on the hardness of the following problem:
Definition 1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellam Problem (DDH).). On input g, g a , g b , Z ∈ G, decide whether Z = g ab or just a random element in G. The DDH assumption states that the DDH problem is hard for any polynomial-time bounded algorithm.
Monotone Span Programs
Let Υ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be a monotone boolean function. A monotone span program for Υ over a field F is an × t matrix M with entries in F, along with a labeling function a : [ ] → [n] that associates each row of M with an input variable of Υ , that for every (x 1 , ..., x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , satisfies the following:
Υ (x 1 , ..., x n ) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∃v ∈ F 1× such that vM = [1, 0, 0, ..., 0], and (∀i :
In other words, Υ (x 1 , ..., x n ) = 1 if and only if the rows of M indexed by {i|x a(i) = 1} span the vector [1, 0, 0, ..., 0]. We call the length and t the width of the span program, and + t the size of the span program.
Readers may refer to [22] for the details.
Overview
Basic Idea
There are three entities in our system:
-Attribute Authority (AA): It is responsible for setting up the public parameters and issuing user secret keys for various attributes. In practice, it can be a government authority, computer service centre of an university or human resources department of a company.
-User: Any entity who has a user secret key is an user. A user can have different attributes. -Survey Centre (SC): It is an organization to organize a survey. It is responsible to define the required policy of the survey, to collect the survey from users and to verify the result.
Basically our system is an ABS scheme. Each user generates an ABS using his own attributes required by the current survey. However, due to the unlinkability property of an ABS scheme, it is not suitable to be used directly, since a user may submit the survey more than once. We modify an ABS scheme from [22] by adding linkability to it. That is, any verifier is able to detect whether two signatures are generated by the same user within a single survey. Yet any user that generates two signatures in two different surveys cannot be linked. The survey centre can discard any double-submitted survey to maintain the accuracy of the result.
Assumptions
We assume each user communicates with SC through an anonymous channel [25, 14] or uses some IP-hiding technology. We also assume that the user keeps his secret key in a safe place. This can be achieved by some external means, such as keeping the secret key in a device to be always in possession or set it to be password-protected. When considering some attacks such as IP hijacking, distributed denial-of-service attack, man-in-the-middle attack etc., it is out of the scope of this paper.
Threat Model
In this sytem, we consider the following attacks:
1. (Unforgeability Attack:) The attacker acts as an unauthorized user (who does not possess the required attributes) who tries to submit a survey to the SC for being accepted. 2. (Anonymity Attack:) The attacker acts as the AA colluded with the SC who tries to find out the identity of the user of a particular submission. 3. (Linkability Attack:) The attacker acts as an authorized user who tries to submit more than one survey to the SC for being accepted in a single survey event. 4. (Unlinkability (for different users) Attack:) The attacker acts as an authorized user who tries to submit some surveys to link with other surveys submitted by honest users. The attack may have intention to do so in order to remove other undesirable results submitted by other users.
Notations
Notations used in our system are summarized in Table 1 . Our system consists of different phases. The detailed step-by-step construction of each phase is given in the framed box.
Setup. The AA defines all system parameters and generates the public key and a master secret key.
Details: The AA first generates the system parameters as follows:
Let g, G be generators of G 1 and g, h, h, h 0 , . . . , h tmax , H be generators of G 2 . The value t max is the maximum width of the monotone span programs as defined in Section 3.2. Let A = Z * p be the universe of attributes. 2. Assume the DDH problem (defined in Section 3.1) is hard in G 1 and G 2 .
Let G : {0, 1} * → G 1 , H : {0, 1} * → Z p be hash functions that will be modeled as random oracles. The system parameters T P K is (
Then it generates the public and master secret keys as follows:
1. Choose a 0 , a, b, c ∈ R Z p and compute:
and the master secret key ASK as (a, a 0 , b, s, v, w, z). Publish both AP K and T P K while keep ASK secret.
User Key Generation. The AA issues user secret key to each user, according to different attributes each user possesses. This is an interactive protocol between each user and the AA.
Details:
1. The user with an attribute set A ∈ A randomly selects L, r L ∈ Z p and computes C L = g L h r L ∈ G 2 and sends C L to the AA. 2. The AA randomly chooses K base ∈ R G 1 , r ∈ R Z p and uses the master secret key ASK to compute: 
3. Compute Π τ as a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of the values (R, S, T , K base , r 0 , L, r L ) satisfying the following relation:
The details of Π τ are shown in Appendix A. 4. Submit the survey data m with its signature
Validity Checking. Upon received the survey, the SC checks its validity. The checking consists of two parts. In the first part, it verifies the signature to see whether it is generated by a qualified user. In the second part, it checks whether this user has submitted another survey before. Note that the user is not allowed to submit more than one survey, no matter the content is the same or not.
Details: Upon received the data m and the signature σ, the SC executes the followings:
1. Signature Verification:
(a) Convert the policy Υ such that Υ (A) = 1 to its corresponding monotone span program M ∈ Z ×t p , with row labeling function u : [ ] → A.
for j > 1.
(c) Checks if Π τ is a valid proof. The verification of Π τ is also shown in Appendix A. If all equalities hold and the proof is correct, it outputs ACCEPT and proceeds to the second part. Otherwise it outputs REJECT.
Double Submission Checking:
The SC extracts τ from σ and checks its database whether any other signatures for this survey event also contain the the same τ . If yes, that means the user has double submissions. It then outputs REJECT. Otherewise, it outputs ACCEPT and stores the data and signature into its database.
Security Analysis
To explain the security of our online survey system, we first present our design philosophy in details. As discussed in Section 2, the primitive attribute-based signature (ABS) is the closest solution to our problem. Thus, it is natural to construct our system from an existing ABS. An ABS is a tuple of five algorithms, namely, TSetup, ASetup, AttrGen, Sign, Ver, which are briefly reviewed below for completeness. Interested readers may refer to [22] for their formal definitions.
-TSetup is responsible for system parameters creation.
-ASetup is the process of creating the master key of the attribute authority.
-AttrGen is invoked to certify the attribute of a user.
-Sign is responsible for signature generations.
-Ver is responsible for signature verifications.
It is straightforward to observe the correspondence of an ABS and an online survey system. Specifically, the Setup procedure of our system consists of TSetup and ASetup. User Key generation procedure corresponds to AttrGen. For survey submission, the user submits the survey response together with an ABS-signature generated from Sign. Finally, the validity checking is realized by verifying the ABS-signature on the survey response, that is, an invocation of the algorithm Ver.
The security properties of any ABS, namely, unforgeability and perfect privacy would protect the resulting online survey system from unforgeability attack, anonymity attack and linkability attack. Unfortunately, such a system will be vulnerable under unlinkability attack. The reason is obvious, since an authorized user can submit the survey response together with a freshly generated attributebased signature repeatedly without being detected. This lead to our approach, which is to restrict the number of times a signing key can be used for each survey event.
Our idea is to require that for each signature, the signer is required to attach with a piece of information called tag, which is a pseudo-random function on input of event and a secret that is known only to the user. If the user is in possession of one single secret, for each event, he/she can only create one tag without being detected. At the same time, since the secret is known only to the user, no one will be able to trace this user given tag.
The final issue is to bind the user secret to his/her signing key. With this binding, one authorized user will only be able to use the specific signing key. We introduce the technique of "certified signing key". Specifically, for each attributebased signing key issued to an authorized user, the attribute authority also generates a standard signature on the signing key together with the commitment of the user secret. This standard signature is used to certify that this specific signing key is generated directly from the attribute authority and binds the signing key to this specific user secret. At the same time, the user secret is not revealed to the attribute authority due to the hiding property of the commitment scheme.
Finally, whenever the user uses his/her signing key, a zero-knowledge proof will be attached. The zero-knowledge proof serves as an evidence that the attributebased signature is created from a "certified" signing key and that the tag is generated correct from event and the committed user secret.
Notes on Our Practical System. Our online survey system is built following the above framework using the ABS from [22] . The standard signature scheme used to certify the signing key together with the committed user secret is the signature scheme from [1] . The user secret is just a random element from L ∈ Z p for some prime p and that the commitment scheme is the well-known Pedersen commitment. The pseudo-random function on the user secret and event was defined as: F : L, event → G(event) L .
It can be seen easily that the user secret key (K base , K 0 , {K u } u∈A , R, S, T , L, r L ) in our system can be classified into three groups.
1. ABS signing key. (K base , K 0 , {K u } u∈A ) is exactly a signing key from the ABS scheme due to [22] 2. User secret: (L). The Pedersen commitment of the user secret is C L = g L h r L and thus r L is the randomness used in the commitment. 3. Certification of the signing key. (R, S, T, L) is the standard signature (of the scheme [1] ) on the tuple (K base , C L ).
Note that we have simplified the process of "certified signing key" by signing K base and C L since each signing key is uniquely determined by the value K base .
The role of the zero-knowledge proof Π τ in the survey submission can be explained easily after this classification. It states that the generator of the ABS signature is in possession of a user secret L and that the tag τ is created correctly from τ . In addition, the generator of the signature is creating this signature from a "certified signing key" (i.e., he/she is in possession of a standard signature (R, S, T, L) on the tuple (K base , C L ) and that K base is used in this ABS signature creation and C L is a commitment of L). Now we are ready to give a security argument based on the threat model defined in Section 4.3.
1. Security against Unforgeability Attack. Each survey response has to be accompanied with a properly created attribute-based signature and in our system, only authorized users are issued the signing keys. Thus, if the ABS scheme from [22] is unforgeable, our system is secure against unforgeability attack. 2. Security against Anonymity Attack. The only information related to the survey participant is the ABS signature, the zero-knowledge proof Π τ and the tag τ . Due to the perfect privacy of the ABS scheme from [22] , the ABS part leaks no information about the actual participant. The zeroknowledge proof Π τ (details are given in Figure ??) , a standard non-interactive Σ-protocol, leaks no information due to its zero-knowledgeness (in the random oracle model). Finally, the tag τ itself is created from G(event) L . Since L is never shown in plain and is protected by the perfect hiding property of the Pedersen commitment, it again leaks no information about the survey participant. In fact, our construction provides a stronger level of privacy. Specifically, if the user never participate in the same survey more than once, his participation across different surveys are not relatable under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. That is, given event 1 , event 2 , G(event 1 ) L and a value τ * , it is computationally hard to tell if τ * = G(event 2 ) L or not. Recall that our system is built on bilinear groups with pairingê : G 1 × G 2 → G T such that the DDH problem is hard in both G 1 and G 2 . 3. Security against Linkability Attack. Each authorized user in our system is given only one "certified signing key" only and thus for each survey, he or she can only generate one unique tag τ . This is due to the fact that the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof Π τ is sound (i.e. the attacker cannot produce a fake proof) and the signature from [1] is unforgeable (i.e. the attacker cannot produce a fake certified signing key).
4.
Unlinkability (for different users) Attack. Two surveys are linked if they share the same tag τ . In order to use a tag, the attacker has to produce the zero-knowledge proof Π τ . That is, the attacker either produces a fake proof or has to know the value of L that is used to generate τ . The former is computationally impossible under the soundness property of the zeroknowledge proof Π τ . The latter is computationally impossible under the discrete logarithm assumption.
A Practical Example
Here we briefly describe how to deploy our system in a company. Assume there is a multinational corporation ABC, which is working in the cosmetics business arena. The human resources department (HR) acts as the AA to carry out the Setup phase. When a new staff joins this corporation, the HR issues his/her secret key by executing User Key Generation phase. The attribute set may contain the following items: sex, marital status, location, date of birth and department. Suppose the marketing department of ABC intends to introduce a new night cream product into its Japanese market product line. Part of the feasibility study involves conducting an online survey to find out the preference of Japanese women in the Japanese market. As a preliminary step, the marketing department would like to conduct the survey to the staff of ABC before gathering responses from the public. To do this, firstly the marketing department will act as the SC. In this scenario, the targets are very clear, namely Japanese female staffs. All the Japanese female staffs can use their secret key to sign the completed online form by using Survey Submission algorithm using the attribute "female" and "Japanese". The signed and completed form may be sent back to the server through an anonymous channel. The marketing department executes Validity Checking to check the validity of each survey. It discards any survey which has not been signed by the attribute "female" and "Japanese", and those who are linked (that means duplicated copies).
Performance Analysis
Generic Analysis. We give the performance analysis of our concrete instantiation described in Section 5.1. We first give a generic analysis, which varies for different attribute sets and signing policies. We only count the time required for exponentiation and pairing. Other operations such as hashing, group addition, integer addition/multiplication etc. are insignificant compared with exponentiation and pairing. For exponentiation, we further optimize for those bases which are constant. It allows the use of some pre-processed data for faster computation.
For pairing, we also optimize for those such that one of the pairing elements is a constant. We put our analyzed result in Table 2 . We use t max to represent the maximum width of the monotone span program, |A| to represent the number of attributes a user has, t and to represent the width and length of the monotone span program converted from the signing claim policy respectively. Concrete Example. Next we analyze the efficiency of our scheme using the simulation result from jPBC [21] for the following devices:
-A desktop equiped with Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Quad CPU Q6600 2.40GHz, 3 GB RAM, Ubuntu 10.04 as the simulation device.
We measured the performance using a 160-bit secret key in elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC). It is generally believed that a 160-bit secret key in ECC provides stronger security than a 1024-bit key in RSA. We use the example described in Section 5.3 to illustrate the exact running time and communication overhead.
In the example, we assume the following attributes: The simulation result is shown in Table 3 . The unit for running time is ms while the unit for public parameter AP K, secret key and signature is byte. 
Other Applications
We note that the protocol described in this paper is specifically designed for online survey systems. However, we do not eliminate the possibility to apply our scheme (or modified version) in other environments if they find it suitable. We list some of the potential applications:
Electronic Voting (E-Voting) [7, 11, 5, 13, 12, 19] is introduced to replace existing punched-card and mechanical voting systems. With e-voting, one can cast ballots from the comfort of his/her home or from mobile devices like cellular phones or iPads, and this is a great convenience to people, especially those disabled and aging population. On the other hand, e-voting also introduces a wide range of privacy and security issues. As an example, tallying authorities want to be assured that a ballot is from a voter satisfying certain requirements and any eligible voter can vote only once (to eliminate double-voting), but due to privacy concerns voters want to prevent tallying authorities from telling who they are. One of the solutions is using linkable ring signatures [18, 20, 3, 10, 31, 4, 17] . Like normal ring signatures, linkable ring signatures provide signer anonymity but one can verify whether or not two ring signatures were signed using the same key. In the scenario of e-voting, the voter first creates a group of eligible voters and then produces a linkable ring signature on the ballot. Such a signature ensures the tallying authority that the ballot is from an eligible person in the group but does not tell who the actual voter is, due to the anonymity of ring signatures. Any double voting will be detected since the signature is linkable. E-voting based on linkable ring signature has demonstrated several practicefriendly properties, but a closer look discovers a subtle issue to be addressed, namely how to tell if someone else is eligible for the voting when one forms a group of eligible persons. This issue can be easily solved in some cases, e.g., "any female staff is eligible for voting", but not if the requirements include "anyone with monthly income less than $1,000". It is very unlikely that such privacy information is publicly known, or an entity wants to share it with others. In such cases, it would be difficult to form a group with a large number of eligible persons, and this could put the privacy of the actual voter at risk.
Another disadvantage of linkable ring signature based e-voting system is the requirement for voters to know the identities or public keys of all eligible voters, especially in the case when the number of voters is very large. It is certainly a desirable choice if one can vote anonymously without the need to find other eligible persons, and this reminds us of attribute-based signatures. Each entity in attributed-based signatures is given a private key according to the attributes he/she possesses. One can use the private key to sign the ballot, and the resulting signature only shows that it is from a person satisfying certain attributes (e.g., the voting requirements). Compared with ring signatures, the advantage of attribute-based signatures is that there is no need to form a group of eligible persons, and thus issues like "Does Alice satisfy voting requirements?" are eliminated. However, we still need to detect double-voting if attribute-based signatures are used in e-voting, and this would require the linkability in ABS.
Smart Grid [24] is a form of electricity network utilizing modern digital technology. The most distinctive feature in smart grid is its two-way capabilities for data communication: Not only the grid controller can issue commands to intelligent devices, consumers and devices can also send data to grid controllers. This feature brings controllers and consumers with an in-depth insight of energy usage, which would lead to a more efficient electricity system.
Attribute-based signature seems to be a promising approach to address the aforementioned issue. Each entity is given a private key according to the attributes he/she possesses. One can sign the energy consumption data using his/her own private key, and such a signature can convince the service provider that the data is from a person satisfying certain attributes, without the need to seek other consumers with similar attributes. It is a natural requirement that each data is counted only once in statistical reports, and an attribute-based signature scheme with linkability will better suit that situation. More importantly, smart grid usually comprises big data for analysis. Attribute-based protocol allows a constant complexity for authentication, which is independent to the number of users in the system. Thus it is particularly suitable in this scenario.
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) allow wireless communications between vehicles and roadside infrastructures. Chen et al. [9] addressed the problem of reliability of information exchange between vehicles. Suppose that a car driver Bob receives a message from another vehicle reporting some traffic jam a few miles away, he has no idea whether the message is true or not. At the beginning, he attempts to ignore it. But shortly after that he receives several messages (say n) reporting the same traffic jam. If this number n is a reasonably large number and these messages are sent by n different vehicles, this information is likely to be true, as it seems unlikely that any n vehicles would collude to lie. However, all these messages are sent anonymously due to privacy concern, how can Bob find out whether n received messages are sent by n different legitimate vehicles without discovering the identities of these vehicles? The authors proposed a solution using Threshold Anonymous Announcement (TAA) service.
TAA allows every vehicle to obtain a token from a trusted party. One may broadcast an anonymous message to other vehicles signed by this token so that anyone received this broadcast message may know that it is from a legitimate vehicle yet the identity is unknown. At the same time, TAA provides linkability. That is, if a vehicle sends the same message twice, the receiver will be able to know these two messages are sent by the same vehicle. So it is easy to distinguish whether n messages are from n different vehicles. However, their scheme only provides linkability to the same message from the same signer. If the signer slightly changes the message, e.g., change from "The city area is very congested now." to "Now the city area is very congested.", they appear as two different messages and thus cannot be linked. That is, a receiver cannot distinguish whether these two messages are sent by the same signer.
Using linkable ring signature may resolve this issue, because linkable ring signature provides event-based linkability. In a single event (e.g., traffic congestion announcement in the city area), any two signatures generated by the same singer will be linked, no matter the two signed messages are the same or not. Nevertheless, linkable ring signature requires the signer to know the identities of all legitimate vehicles in the area, which is impossible. An event linkable attributebased signature provides a better solution because it does not require anyone to know other legitimate vehicles, while providing event-based (instead of messagebased) linkability. Simultaneously anonymity of the signer is also preserved.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a new insight to preserve accuracy and privacy in online survey systems simultaneously. The new insight comes from our proposed system. We proved the security of it. The performance analysis is also given to show that our system is efficient and practical. In addition to online survey systems, we further suggested several other applications that can make use of our new system, including e-voting, smart-grid and vehicular ad hoc networks. We believe our system is particular suitable for handling big data as the complexity remains constant, regardless to the number of users.
